Benedictus (a project cocreated by Iranian director Mahmood Karimi-Hakak, Israeli playwright Lotti Lerner, dramaturge and Theatre Without Borders cofounder Roberta Levitow, designer Daniel Michaelson, and Golden Thread artistic director Torange Yeghiazarian) opens with the secret reunion of two old school friends, one Muslim and one Jewish, both Iranian born, and both former activists in the politically broad-based mass uprising that overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran’s CIA-installed dictator, in 1979.

Kenneth Stein: Describe how Iran has been ruled, who makes the key decisions, and the road traveled from the revolution to 2009.

David Menashri: Both before and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (also known as the Iranian Revolution), Iran has been and remains a very important country in the Middle East because of its rich history, strategic location, and culture. The Islamic Revolution drew people from different strata of society, with different ideologies. The result of the revolution has been an Islamic republic; the aim of the people was to improve the life of the people of Iran. A major problem facing Iran, after 30 years, is the degree that it has or has not been able to ease, not solve, the basic problems facing the Iranian nation. The Iranian people were struggling for bread and freedom and these two issues remain the major problems facing this regime today.

Gary Sick: Several characteristics about Iran need to be remembered; first, Iran is not a totalitarian dictatorship of the Saddam Hussein variety though it is a repressive regime. Decisions are made by consultations and coalitions among multiple power centers — the supreme leader, the president, the parliament, the merchants in the bazaar, the Revolutionary Guards. While all of these people play a role, they are certainly dominated by the mullahs. Iran has changed dramatically in the last 30 years; it began as a rather fanatical place dominated by almost illusory visions of the world coming to look just like Iran. Initially the regime was out to change all of their neighbors into Islamic republics; they are not actively doing that anymore.

At the beginning of the revolution, the regime had a tremendous amount of legitimacy and popular support among the people. But over 30 years, as their inability to deliver effective government has been manifest, the regime’s legitimacy has declined. And as it has declined, the use of repression has increased. It seems we’re on a rising curve of repression, and a descending curve of legitimacy, which could create a very dangerous situation for the regime. A number of other factors come into play: The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan that got rid of the Taliban, which was Iran’s worst enemy to the east; the defeat of Saddam Hussein, Iran’s worst enemy to the west, and the installation of a Shi`ite government in Baghdad for the first time in history.

Without doing a single thing, Iran has emerged as a regional power; it’s not just that the Arab countries have been getting weaker, but that the actions of the U.S. have left Iran in a very privileged position. This makes Iran a natural rival to Israel in the Middle East — two countries at the poles; and Arab countries are having a very hard time dealing with this.

Daniel Levy: American policy recently has enhanced Iranian prestige and leverage in the region at the expense of America’s allies. As Gary explained, America has helped put into power Iranian allies in Iraq. Having America as an occupying neighbor in two neighboring states plays very heavily into how Iran looks at its role in the region. America also helped push Syria deeper into the Iranian camp. We must also look at the Hamas-Iranian relationship, which is not a relationship of Shi`ite groupings, as is the case with Hezbollah. It’s a much less obvious relationship; rejecting and actively undermining the Saudi initiative of bringing together the Palestinian sides in a unity government only strengthened the Hamas-Iranian relationship, strengthened Iran, and strengthened Iran’s hand.

Stein: To play the devil’s advocate, it sounds like Iran has kept her tentacles within her immediate borders, but the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the European foreign policy have all given Iran its prominence and prestige. And yet Iran has been active with Syria, with Hezbollah, and with Hamas. How much of the region’s current state of affairs with respect to Iran has been generated by foreigners; how much by Iran?

Menashri: What happened to the Islamic Revolution happens to all revolutions in history; there’s a difference between what is said in opposition and what is done in power. There is a degree of pragmatism in Iran’s policy, and pragmatism does not mean moderation, but calculating the risk of what the regime does and the price it is ready to pay. In almost all cases, when there was a clash between the ideology of the revolution and the interest of the state as interpreted by the regime, interest won over dogma. Within the Iranian political system, there are different interpretations of Islam, different interpretations of the goals of the revolution. We can see very clearly several segments and groups: one is more radical, conservative, extremist, and the other is more pragmatic, reformist, even moderate. Looking at the civil society of Iran, there are sources of encouragement for the future. Out of the Islamic Revolution has emerged an Iranian culture and a national spirit.

Iran takes advantage of opportunities; one of these is Lebanon. Iran did not create Hezbollah or the problem in Lebanon, but it jumped into a vacuum. The same can be said about its relations with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

Stein: Does the supreme leader call the shots and make the key decisions?

Menashri: Ultimately, the final decision is by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. People are asking if a change of president would change Iranian policies. I doubt it; during the eight years of his presidency, President Khatami was not able to change the policies of Iran because, ultimately, the power rested in the hands of the supreme leader. But these elections are very significant. The Iranian political system is complicated, but within a system that doesn’t allow dramatic change, there are some signs of openness and even freedoms. All the candidates must be approved by a committee that discusses the credentials of the candidates. As long as Khamenei is following his own policy, it will be very difficult to see a dramatic change no matter who becomes president. Dialogue may not solve the problem, but I think that it’s an essential step in any serious attempt to solve the problem.

Stein: How would you fashion a policy of diplomatic engagement toward Iran? What would each of the parties gain from diplomatic dialogue?

Levy: First, would it be a narrow or broad attempt at engagement? There has to be an overarching guiding ethos to that conversation. Over the past 30 years we’ve put a lot of issues on our table. While we will have to get to all of them eventually, certain issues are perceived by each side as being more or less urgent. We can’t go into this conversation with a stopwatch, and some of this will obviously have to be done discretely. We might start with Afghanistan, but we’ve got to be willing to have a broad-based conversation.

Stein: Is the Iranian regime fearful that the U.S. wants to see a regime change? And could the U.S. show Iran that it’s sincere by starting with a clear statement that it’s not?

Sick: If the U.S. is not prepared to make clear that regime change is not the driving feature of our policy, the Iranians simply won’t engage. The first step must be agenda building. We need quiet talks with the Iranians, outside the spotlight of media attention, where both parties can say this is what we would like to put on the table. With regard to an agenda, the nuclear issue is first. The U.S. and the international community must decide whether to accept Iranian enrichment if it is subject to much more intensive controls. We have to seek Iran’s assistance as we withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan; we need assurances that they will cooperate or collaborate with us. It would also be realistic to ask Iran to reduce its military assistance to Hezbollah and Hamas.

Both sides need to change their rhetoric; we should stop denouncing Iran as a terrorist state. And Iranian leaders should stop holding rallies at Tehran University and shouting death to America. Both sides are still smarting from wounds. Iran had a revolution, which was as much anti-U.S. as it was anti-Shah.

We have enjoyed the luxury of being able to denounce each other without ever thinking about the consequences of those attacks; we are going to have to start thinking about that now.

Stein: What else is on the Iranian agenda?

Menashri: Closer to home, the Iranians are more cheerful, and farther away, they can be more extremist with their ideological zeal. The most important thing for the Islamic regime today is survival and the continuity of the revolution. The most important thing for the outside world, led by U.S., is the Iranian nuclear program. For Iran, the name of the game is gaining time, and it has done so brilliantly — they have managed to achieve their goals step-by-step. I have supported dialogue for a long time; it may not solve the problem but it is important to send a signal to the Americans and to the people of Iran that America sincerely wants to solve the problem in a diplomatic manner. That’s why Iranians are not that enthusiastic about dialogue; it’s a policy of “carrot and stick.”

Levy: The Iranian nuclear issue is the world’s problem, and the world should solve it. Regionally, Israel and the moderate Arab States share a common interest vis-à-vis Iraq — and such an alliance could reduce Iran’s leverage in the region so that Iran has to recalculate its actions and interests. One way to weaken Iran today is to solve the Palestinian problem; but so far Israel is not taking any steps toward ending the occupation and allowing the creation of a Palestinian State and independence.

Sick: The precipitous drop in oil prices had more of an impact in Iran than years of sanctions. A serious move to address the Palestinian issue would have a much more serious impact on Iran’s regional position and Iran’s ability to speak over the heads of Arab rulers. The key is not to create an alliance against Iran but to reduce Iran’s capacity to impose its footprint on the region. If Iran does cross a certain threshold, it is hoped that more traditional deterrence mechanisms would pull it back from the brink. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons; America and Russia both had nuclear weapons during the Cold War; America and China are in opposing camps and both have nuclear weapons. A country can’t get that much leverage out of it because it is mutual destruction. While Israel may have a military option, it would be extremely ill-advised to use it.

Stein: How is the Syrian-Iranian relationship mutually beneficial?

Sick: On the very simplest level, Syria provides a gateway for Iran to provide equipment, support, and training to Hezbollah across the Lebanese border; it’s a very useful path. Syria, in turn, gets Iran’s strong support to reject an easy sell-out on the Palestinian issue. An Israel-Syria settlement on the Golan Heights would take a huge amount of steam out of the Iranian-Syrian relationship. Syria has shown that they’re interested in negotiating. As David mentioned, time is going to be a major factor influencing how the U.S. and Iran proceed in their negotiations. Iran’s development of its nuclear program has been one of the slowest in history, progressing at a snail’s pace. I agree with Secretary of Defense Bob Gates that Iran is not close to a weapon at this point, so there is time. President Obama has been making positive signals toward Iran, and Iran did not install the 2000 additional centrifuges that were available to them. It benefits us to assume that was a signal that they’re prepared to slowdown their nuclear ambitions.

Stein: David said that two issues remain outstanding for Iran: bread and freedom. Is there something that the U.S., Europe, Israel, and the IMF can do to help Iran on the bread and socioeconomic issue?

Sick: They need foreign direct investment, capital to run their oil and manufacturing industries. If the U.S. offers to deal with Iran, the Iranians couldn’t refuse; their own people would argue, why are you turning them down, we have been looking to join the international community. It is useful for Iran to have that debate in the course of their presidential election; then let’s see who wins.

Stein: Is there a big difference between the way the Europeans and the U.S. look at Iran, both in terms of its nuclear capacity and in terms of engaging in dialogue?

Levy: There is something to the claim that Iran has a right to develop civilian nuclear energy power; of course, Iran’s history of not allowing for verification means that one’s antenna should be up, and safeguards in place, and we might need to take a step back from alarmist predictions. The former deputy head of strategic planning of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) says, Iran is eternally 18 months away from the bomb. It would be very healthy for Israel and the Jewish community to be very serious about security, to be very serious about the threats that Iran poses, but not to get into a “gevalt” mentality. A comprehensive approach to both peacemaking and regional security is ultimately going to be the best way to manage the Iranian situation.

Stein: Islam as a platform for political mobilization is not new in the Middle East. To what degree did the Khomeini Revolution give sanction to Islam as a platform? And could anyone have done anything to slow down the process?

Sick: One can always go back and replay the historical tape, and come out in a different place — the what-if game. But the Iranian Revolution was the first time that the U.S. and much of the world came into direct contact with Islamic politics. Political Islam burst on the world scene with the Iranian Revolution. We weren’t prepared for it, and we didn’t know what was coming.

Levy: Equally important is that in the Middle East the lack of civil society meant that the only place to organize, the only alternative space to the regime, was the mosque. No one was thinking about how to handle political Islam as a rising force, as a consequence of our democratization program. While there is one model in the Shi`a world, there is another in the Sunni world, and we still don’t know if we can pursue engagement — even a conversation — with the Brotherhood-style, non-al-Qaeda manifestations of political Islam — those who want to be part of the democratic process. And that’s still the strongest emerging force wherever there is a democratic opening, whether in Egypt, or in Gaza with Hamas, or elsewhere.

Menashri: Thirty years ago the world was not prepared for the potential of the Islamic movement to take power in a major country like Iran. Today, the world is watching and much more aware of the potential of Islamist movements. So while the Iranian Revolution provided encouragement to Islamism, its success in overthrowing the Shah may also be seen as a cautionary tale.

Marc Gopin

Over the past 25 years I’ve developed relationships across the Middle East; in Syria, specifically, over the past five years. While I traveled as a peacemaker, to be cautious I would emphasize my role as a professor and only reveal my role as a rabbi when it felt safe. I never experienced any negative comments because I am a rabbi; rather I heard from some a longing to meet with old Jewish friends. Experiences with Syrians have given me confidence that similar inroads can be made in Iran. What Iran shares with Syria, most importantly, is a historical tradition of religious pluralism and progressive religious thinking. There is still severe prejudice against Baha’is and overt secularists, but Iran does have a historical tradition of interfaith tolerance. This may shock readers who look at Iran through the lens of Ayatollah Khomeini’s seizure of power in 1979. But that oversimplifies Iran — its problems, its dangers, and also its potential promise for the region and the world.

As I read Abdolkarim Soroush, a great contemporary religious philosopher, I find an Iranian who is pioneering an understanding of how Orthodox religion could (and must) coexist with a secular state. Now, he is on the far left and quite suspect by the government, but his writings suggest that this is a country rich in religious thought, art, poetry, mysticism, and higher learning; once the radical revolution of 1979 runs its course, Iran may become a beacon of modern Islamic civilization.

This does not mean that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the president of the country are not problematic. And because the country is staking its defense and even national pride on the development of nuclear power and a nuclear bomb, it’s all the more reason to aggressively engage Iran now. If the U.S. were to engage Iran in serious, “grand bargain” negotiations to culminate in embassies, full recognition, and an end to all covert efforts to overthrow the government, Iran would likely join the table. This is exactly what happened with Libya and also with the former Soviet Union. It did not turn these countries into allies, but these gestures avoided the destructive course of war and saved countless lives.

President Barack Obama delivered a brilliant three-minute New Year’s greeting to the Iranian people and to the Islamic Republic of Iran. He has wisely acknowledged the state’s existence as a way to befriend the population and to perhaps encourage the elections in the direction of reform. Timing is everything in politics and conflict management. The Reformists were in power before, but not at a time when the U.S. was ready to acknowledge past mistakes and to bargain honestly about a new Iranian-American relationship.

Iran must deliver, as part of a “grand bargain” with the West, a serious commitment to move its clients globally in the direction of defense rather than offense, statecraft rather than militancy, participation rather than subversion. Its clients and allies, for example, must refrain from calling for the destruction of whole countries, and focus instead on the substance of their conflicts and policy differences with adversaries. Iran must distance itself and its clients from the language of total war and the covert terrorism that accompanies such language.

The Iranian people are among the most pro-American Muslims in the Middle East, and their government is the most democratic to a degree. But, until now the U.S. has mistakenly aligned itself only with Saudi Arabia, the least democratic. No one needs to abandon the Saudis, but neither does one need be held hostage to centuries of rivalry, hostility, and Wahabi prejudice toward Persians and Shi`ites. The Saudis have legitimate fears of Iranian uses of Shi`ite populations in the Gulf to destabilize regimes, but all factions of the Saudi family must acknowledge and accept the permanent presence of alternative forms of Islamic power and culture in the region and the world. The King of Saudi Arabia has moved in this direction, and with a decisive Western intention to weave together rather than drive a wedge between Sunni and Shi`ite, we may see a new beginning in the Middle East.

No matter how balanced a relationship the U.S. maintains with the Northern and Southern Belts of the Middle East, or with Shi`ites and Sunnis, Israel will not be accepted in the Middle East until it embraces the Palestinian people as equals, as peace partners. Both Iran and Syria could help by discontinuing to prop up Palestinian rejectionist elements. An effective peace process is completely interrelated.

All of this is possible; leaders across the Middle East and the U.S. are seeking a new relationship. We are living in an unprecedented historical moment of openness of both the Syrian and Saudi leadership to the possibility of normalizing relations with Israel. Serious plans have been offered but not responded to. The next crucial step is to elicit peaceful overtures from Iran toward a new Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Jewish community must do everything in their power, for the sake of their fellow Jews in Israel and Iran, to invite all parties to a table of peace. They must embrace all possibilities of peace at this rare moment of enlightened American leadership. 

Ruth Lande

 For thousands of years, the Jewish people have known strife, hardship, and persecution. For thousands of years, “Jewish diplomacy” has found innovative, creative, and “out-of-box” solutions for untold problems. Currently faced with complexity and challenge, the State of Israel and the Jewish people are once more called upon to demonstrate ingenuity and wisdom.

As our forefathers did in the international arena, our objective must remain to mould every challenge into an opportunity. Today, as we face the Iranian question, I hope the following steps might guide our thinking.

First, we must nurture a healthy dose of humility, which may diminish our delusional sense that “we know it all.” That is, every time that we develop a strategy vis-à-vis any given dilemma, we owe it to ourselves, as a country and as a people, to ask ourselves, what would be the exact opposite mechanism with which to address this problem (i.e., the eternal Jewish wisdom encompassed in the concept of “Ipkha Mistabra”)?

Second, there will not necessarily be others in the region who shall seek to find those opportunities for us, or make it easier for us to sift through the darkness and find light. It is, thus, our own responsibility to create that light, with or without writing it off as a Jewish or Israeli patent….

Third, there are, indeed, many opportunities waiting to be seized in the Middle East and it would be unwise to forego a chance to jump on the train before it leaves our station. That is, without at least first evaluating whether we wish to reach the train’s final destination and/or whether remaining in the same spot would prove to be a better/worse alternative in the long run.

Finally, we simply have little choice but to seek aligned interests amidst our neighbors and, if necessary, to create those opportunities “yesh me’ayin” (from nothing), while simultaneously preparing for less optimistic scenarios. The alternative — of waiting for the hatred to grow, for demographics to bring us to our knees, and for turning into those who “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity” — is formidable.

What, then, is the “opportunity” for Israel vis-à-vis the Iranian dilemma?

The Iranian threat to Israel comprises both a rhetorical declaration to destroy the country and a burgeoning nuclear capability, which constitutes “casus belli.” Nonetheless, Iran poses an obvious threat first and foremost to its Arab competitors (namely, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan), for several reasons: The Sunni-Shi`a divide; Iran’s quest for leadership of the Islamic world; Iran’s ambition for regional hegemony in the Middle East; and the intense bilateral tensions that each of the aforementioned countries faces vis-à-vis its relationship with Iran.

Egypt, for example, has the Iranian Shah buried under the central-most mosque in its capital, which is a long-term source of irritation for the Iranian Revolutionary regime. Iran, on its part, continues to name one of the main streets of Tehran after the late President Sadat’s assassin, Islamboulie, a rather awkward reality for Egypt. And to make matters worse, many an article in Egyptian papers in the past years has dealt with the ousting of “Iranian diplomats” from the “embassy” in Cairo, which has been degraded into a merely representative office.

In the international context, when the Obama administration recently declared that it would not allow a nuclear arms race to take place in the Middle East, apart from expressing its concern over Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the administration was also communicating its inherent understanding of the immense fear Sunni Arab states in the region have of Iran’s nuclear program, and how that fear might influence their desires to gain similar capabilities in the medium- and long-term future.

The interests of the world’s significant powers, namely Russia, China, and the E.U., add yet more complexity to an already challenging situation. These players have more than their share of economic, political, and strategic interests in the Middle East, and they might not be pleased to witness a formidable arms race staged in the area. An arms race could not only be detrimental to the key economic assets they nurture in the region, but could also proliferate fissile material and know-how to non-state extremist players, thereby threatening both international stability and their own geographical spheres.

So, what should Israel do?

Should it take the sole responsibility for falling into the Iranian trap and allow itself to become the main engineer of eliminating Tehran’s nuclear capability in the service of the entire globe?

Not necessarily.

We need a sophisticated approach to manage such a complex situation. Tapping into the Jewish wisdom of “Ipkha Mistabra” might tackle this dilemma on three different fronts:

On the bilateral level, Israel needs to reach out to the Iranian nation. The Israeli leadership, without regard to its political affiliations, must speak to the Iranian people and emphasize that neither Israel nor the Jewish people have any quarrel with the people of Iran. Likewise, the Jewish people throughout the world could serve as a bridge to the Persians, rather than exacerbate the enmity and expand it into an Iranian-Jewish issue. Endless declarations of so-called deterrence toward the Iranian regime (which articulates the “not tolerating a nuclear Iran” message) do little to deter Iran’s quest to become a nuclear power. Rather, such declarations legitimize the current leadership, which consequently uses the rhetoric to justify their oppressive behavior and their horrendous disregard for human rights in the face of the “terrible external threat” — Israel.

On the regional and international levels, Israel should work with the Arab states, mediated by the international community, to develop coordinated strategies that could prevent Iran from creating the means of delivery, and furthering their technological know-how.

More draconian economic sanctions would hurt the civilian population. A campaign for resolutions within the Arab league, and “sanctions of honor and prestige” administered by Arab states, on the other hand, might challenge Iran’s leadership position in the OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries).

We are a people of our own destiny. Rather than wait to be saved, Israel should reach out in a sophisticated, diplomatic, and at times low-profile manner, to those with whom she shares this particular challenge. Inspired by the concept of “Ipkha Mistabra,” we may just happen to turn such initiative into a well-coordinated, “out-of-the-box” platform for cooperation. 

Dora Levy Mossanen

 I am an amalgam of cultural identities and influences — Israel, Iran, America — that consciously and subconsciously nourish my imagination and animate my novels. How can they not? Memories — the shrill scream of sirens that sent us for shelter to dark Tel Aviv basements, the much-anticipated sound of music from microphones in streets announcing Israel’s independence, the hours spent by my mother’s side on Ben Yehudah Street waiting for the family’s weekly ration of two eggs — are the cornerstone of stories. Also embedded in my memory are my first impressions of Iran, which coincided with the 1953 coup d’état that ousted then Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. One day the Tehran streets brimmed with demonstrators supporting Mossadegh, dragging down statues of the Shah, who had left for Italy with his first wife, Soraya; the very next day, jeeps crossed the same street, the portrait of the Shah prominently displayed, blaring microphones announcing his return. Such was my introduction to Iran, this country of contradictions.

My grandfather, Habib Levy, was a renowned historian of Iranian Jews; he left me with a legacy of fascinating familial, cultural, and historical events that continue to supply fodder for my stories. He spoke of the plight of Jews in Mahaleh, the Jewish ghetto, his wedding to my grandmother, who was a mere child of nine, his experiences as the dentist of Reza Shah, the intricate politics of court, and the conspiracies and betrayals that took place in Reza Shah’s harem. He recounted how he was forced to extract the Shah’s rotting teeth without the help of painkillers because the Shah was an opium addict and painkillers of the time would have proven lethal. My colorful and eccentric grandmothers, who possessed an encyclopedic treasure trove of Persian-Jewish proverbs, curses, blessings, and old world beliefs of their ancestors, continue to pepper my novels.

Iran’s air is dense with scents of oven-warm bread, rosewater, and cherry blossoms in spring, blessed with poets such as Sa’adi and Hafez, and the ancient Zoroastrian belief that good triumphs over evil. But also, due to her rich natural reserves and sensitive geographical position in the Middle East, Iran has known her share of foreign invasions and internal political upheavals — the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911, the Nationalist Revolt of 1951–1953, the eight-year-long 1980 war with Iraq, and the most enduring uprising, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 that forced the Shah and the Empress Farah to flee and my family and me to follow suit.

One’s imagination depends, in part, on the “space” one occupies in a culture. In a Moslem country, an Iranian Jew is allowed a very small space indeed. Stepping into other times and lives is a way of stretching and expanding the limited space imposed upon a writer. Imagination becomes one’s most cherished private wealth, a safe place to navigate without fear of persecution.

America allows a more generous space to openly observe one’s faith, the freedom to write honestly without fear of censorship or imprisonment. Taking advantage of events and characters forever ingrained in my consciousness, I dig into my Persian roots and draw on the tradition of magical realism, mythology, folklore, and superstition to create a poetic style that is uniquely Persian. An ancient literary heritage enhances my stories and infuses the experiences of my characters, misunderstood outsiders, mystics, and underdogs made to feel small and inconsequential behind ghetto walls, determined souls who navigate the reality of their harsh worlds to overcome insurmountable hurdles.

If history would have unfolded differently, and I would have found myself a writer in some other place, the candor essential to my “retelling” would have been unimaginable. The Persian curse, “May you wander from place to place,” has turned into a unique blessing in my writing life.

While the plight of the homeless is addressed in a number of traditional Jewish texts (especially within law codes), one is hard pressed to find explicit petitions to God to provide shelter for the homeless in our liturgy. At first glance, this may be troubling; among the many praises of God, why don’t we have a prayer that thanks God for providing shelter for the homeless?

The answer is twofold: first, the obligation to assist the homeless rests with the community, not God. Secondly, prayer serves to strengthen our resolve to meet this obligation by cultivating compassion and stirring our souls to action.

There are two themes within Jewish liturgy that when viewed through the lens of homelessness affirm our obligations and cultivate empathy and compassion. I call the first theme “night is a dangerous time” and the second “longing for a place to call home.”

In Adon Olam, we read: “Into God’s hand I place my spirit, when I sleep and when I wake, and with my spirit also my body; the Lord is with me, I shall not fear.” The evening prayer, Hashkiveinu asks that God allow us to enter into nighttime in peace. The early morning prayers, Birkhot HaShakhar, contain fifteen blessings that are traditionally recited upon waking in the morning. Through these prayers, we thank God for the ability to rise intact from our beds in the morning. These prayers acknowledge the dangers of the night and the surrender of the self that occurs during sleep. Many of us are privileged to rise from a bed with clean sheets and a comfortable pillow in a room encased by other rooms that are ultimately protected from dangers with doors, locks, and well-constructed roofs. These prayers should remind us what the words “into God’s hand I place my spirit” mean to the schizophrenic middle-aged man sleeping in a cardboard box under a highway bridge or to the unemployed mother of three who finds temporary shelter among strangers in a city shelter. With the increase of hate crimes against the homeless and the dangers of natural elements, the night is indeed a terrifying time; to wake up whole and healthy is truly a blessing.

The other theme, “longing for a place to call home” appears most prominently in the psalms that nestle our core prayers. Psalm 27, recited during the month of Elul preceding the Yamim Noraim, gives the fullest expression to this longing: “One thing I ask of the Lord, only that do I seek: to dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life….” Similarly, Psalm 92, recited during Kabbalat Shabbat, describes the ideal life through the metaphor of a tree that is deeply rooted in the house of God. This centuries-old longing for the comfort of being in God’s presence is about that primal longing for “home.” We yearn for a sense of the security, safety, and comfort that being in God’s presence might offer. These prayers remind us on a daily basis that home is not simply shelter; home is a shelter that is reliable, steady, safe, and secure.

As our own existential longing for home is reactivated each time we recite prayers, that longing should ignite our compassion for those who truly lack a home; that compassion should compel us to act and to fulfill the obligations to cloth the naked, feed the hungry, and provide shelter for the homeless.

Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East by Martin Indyk (Simon & Schuster, New York, 512 pages, 2009, $28)

The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power by David Sanger (Harmony Books, 498 pages, 2009, $33.00)

Reviewed by David Twersky

What will the Obama administration’s policies in the Middle East look like? According to two new books on various aspects of the problem, whatever America does — or doesn’t do — will leave the Middle East different than it is today. American action, diplomatic and/or military, has its obvious consequences; so too do American inaction, diplomatic and/or military withdrawal, or disengagement.

The Bush administration, whose responsibilities for the subject has only recently ended, sought to spread democracy and end with stability and peace. The Clinton administration had sought peace and thought that would lead to security and stability. Neither succeeded, but President Bush is leaving the world in a more perilous state, largely because of the Iraq war.

Or at least so concludes David Sanger, who has long covered Washington and the world for the New York Times, and who maintains that North Korea is more dangerous than it was eight years ago; that Iran is far closer to possessing a nuclear weapon; and that already nuclear-armed Pakistan is closer to unraveling.

In The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power, Sanger presents six deeply disturbing views of different world problems that all pose daunting challenges to American power and American values. Interestingly, the Israel-Palestine dispute is not one of them. The six areas are in order: Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, China, and what he calls the “Three Vulnerabilities” — a dirty bomb, chemical, and cyber attack.

If you are the worrying type or want to lose sleep, this book would a great place to start.

With respect to Iran, he argues that the Bush administration did too little, too late; imposed weak sanctions lacking the necessary bite to alter Iranian behavior; and opened the door to Iranian penetration into the Arab world by destroying the Saddam regime. Sanger proposes the imposition of a tough embargo on Iranian imports of refined gasoline products; this, he says, would bring them to their knees. But such a move would require what amounts to a naval blockade in order to search incoming vessels. Such a blockade could credibly be seen by Tehran as a casus belli. At that point the distinction between sanctions and military action blurs beyond recognition.

Because of the enormous energies required to change the dynamic in Iraq from “the war is lost” to the “war is winnable,” the requisite attention for Afghanistan and the other tough spots was never forthcoming under Bush.

Across the border lies not only the al-Qaeda central, but both the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban, each seeking pure Islamist rule. The problem in Pakistan is that the army’s intelligence services are supporting the Taliban and want to see a pro-Pakistan Sunni state in Afghanistan. And the big problem is the fate of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Will the security envelope be penetrated by Islamist sympathizers? Will al-Qaeda/Taliban get its hands on a nuclear weapon? According to Sanger, this danger is right up there with North Korea and Iran. North Korea not only developed several bombs but proliferated weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by selling Syria (at least) the design and materials to build a nuclear reactor to turn out weapons’ grade uranium — the one that was bombed by the Israelis in September 2007.

In Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East, Martin Indyk makes the excellent point that Bill Clinton’s peace-process diplomacy “pitted him against the established order in the Arab world.” If today there is a change, it is because Obama has not yet earned credibility — will he stand up to Iran or cut a deal at the expense of the Arab countries and Israel? — and because of  Iran’s push toward regional hegemony at a minimum and its progress in acquiring the bomb. Having been threatened by peace under Clinton, and threatened by the “democracy” policies of Bush, the Arab established order is now threatened most by the rise of Iran.

Another complicating factor is that, in addition to preserving their own power, regional “actors are pursuing complex and obscure agendas not served by peacemaking.” Not only are Arab leaders holding different cards, they are playing an additional game.

Indyk shares details about the Clinton years, when he contributed significantly to discussions about Iraq; it is clear that the harder view of Iraq — including a commitment to regime change — began while Clinton was in the White House. During those discussions authoritative voices made the argument that any effort to dislodge Saddam’s forces from southern Iraq (where they were massacring Shiites and the Marsh Arabs) would lead to a greater role for Iran. Which state was worse? Indyk proposed a policy of “Dual Containment,” an attempt to keep Iran and Iraq in their respective boxes, limiting the damage either could do.

Indyk argues that then Prime Minister Barak essentially had a failure of nerve — that a Syrian track should have been pursued and that it held the greater promise for success. To Obama, Indyk recommends a commitment to addressing the Palestinian issue and expressing support for the renewal of Israeli-Syrian talks.

With respect to Iran, Indyk acknowledges a “chicken-and-egg” problem. An Israeli-Syrian peace and, when possible, a resolution of the Israel-Palestine problem would weaken Iran and break up its emerging anti-American coalition. And weakening Iran (and ensuring that it does not acquire a nuclear weapon) will weaken Hamas and Hezbollah and Syria, and make peacemaking more possible.

American policies change but they always reshape and reconfigure the states in the Middle East.